


Encryption, Authentication, and Access Control

Jon Green Rich Langston June 2013








Today's Goals




 Give a *basic* background in cryptography and public key infrastructure

- What is symmetric key crypto?
- What is asymmetric key crypto?
- What are certificates and PKI?
- Show how to use public certs with our controller
- Show how these two come together to create 802.1X











Cryptography Primer







- *Plain text* is normal, unencrypted text
- A Cipher is an encryption technique
- Cipher Text is the unreadable output on the Cypher











 Bob and Alice are traditionally used in examples of cryptography







Meet The New Bob, Alice, and Eve





Max, aka "Bob"




Agent 99, aka "Alice"



Konrad of Kaos, aka "Eve"




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


Symmetric Key Cryptography










Symmetric Key Cryptography (2)






- Strength:
 - Simple and very fast (order of 1000 to 10000 faster than asymmetric mechanisms)
- Weakness:
 - Must agree the key beforehand
 - How to securely pass the key to the other party?
- Examples: AES, 3DES, DES, RC4
- AES is the current "gold standard" for security






Public Key Cryptography (Asymmetric) AIRHEADS






Public Key Cryptography (2)






- Strength
 - Solves problem of passing the key Anyone can use the public key to encrypt a message, but only recipient can decrypt
 - Allows establishment of trust context between parties
- Weakness:
 - Slow (MUCH slower than symmetric)
 - Problem of trusting public key (what if I've never met you?)
- Examples: RSA, DSA, ECDSA






Hybrid Cryptography






- Randomly generate "session" key
- Encrypt data with "session" key (symmetric key cryptography)
- Encrypt "session" key with recipient's public key (public key cryptography)





Hash Function





- Properties
 - it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message
 - it is infeasible to find a message that has a given hash
 - it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash
 - it is infeasible to modify a message without changing its hash
- Ensures message integrity
- Also called message digests or fingerprints
- Examples: MD5, SHA1, SHA2 (256/384/512)












- Combines a hash with an asymmetric crypto algorithm
- The sender's private key is used in the digital signature operation
- Digital signature calculation:

$$S_{\text{Data}} \Big\{ \text{Data} \Big\} == \text{ Data} + E_{\text{Data}} \Big\{ \text{H(Data)} \Big\}$$

Digital Signature






Summary: Security Building Blocks

Encryption provides

- confidentiality, can provide authentication and integrity protection
- Checksums/hash algorithms provide
 - integrity protection, can provide authentication
- Digital signatures provide
 - authentication, integrity protection, and non-repudiation

• For more info:



Cryptography Decrypted [Paperback] <u>H. X. Mel</u> ♥ (Author), <u>Doris M. Baker</u> (Author) ★★★★★★ ♥ (<u>39 customer reviews</u>)

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
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Certificates, Trust & PKI








What is a Certificate?

- A certificate is a digitally signed statement that binds a public key to some identifying information
 - The signer of the certificate is called its issuer
 - The entity talked about in the certificate is the subject of the certificate
- Certificates in the real world
 - Any type of license, government-issued ID's, membership cards, ...
 - Binds an identity to certain rights, privileges, or other identifiers









What is a Certificate? (2)

Certificate			? X	
General De	Certificate		? ×	
	General De	Certificate	? X	
		General De	Certificate	? ×
This ce	Show: </th <th>Show: <!--</th--><th>General Details Certification Path</th><th></th></th>	Show: </th <th>General Details Certification Path</th> <th></th>	General Details Certification Path	
•E	Versio	Field	Show: <all></all>	
	E Signat	Versio	Field Value]
	Issuer	Serial I	E Version V3	
* Refer	🖃 Valid f	E Issuer	Serial number 3b c7 df 1f 31 bb 99 44 fa 66 f	
	🖃 Valid t	Valid fi	Signature algorithm sha 1RSA	
Is	📃 Subjec	Valid t	Issuer VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server	
	Public		Valid from dinsdag 12 februari 2008 2:00	
		Subjec	Valid to dinsdag 29 maart 2011 1:59:59	
Is	CN = VeriS		Subject mail.intranet.cevi.be, Member	
	OU = Tern		Public key RSA (1024 Bits)	-
Vč	OU = Veris O = Verisio	CN = mail.i OU = Mem		-
	C = US	OU = Mem OU = Auth OU = Term OU = ICT O = Cevi N L = Gent S = Oost-V C = BE	30 81 89 02 81 81 00 aa ea 2b 2a 38 1c aa 26 ab 9b 3a 26 b4 74 bc f0 65 b1 95 45 caa 69 73 17 69 d8 83 4c e9 40 c1 f5 b7 3d 1e 95 f4 59 b8 dc 67 b1 fd 0f 9b 1d 5a 52 55 1e 61 63 10 c9 04 90 9d ac 58 2b 98 23 0e d0 ea 0b 2f 2c d3 05 52 ce 14 80 df ab 5e 32 a5 eb fa c1 bc 20 a1 0c c6 af a6 a2 c2 c 7b d7 61 07 9a 20	
-				
			OK	



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AIRHEADS 2013






- Agent 99 will believe Max's public key belongs to Max <u>if</u> Agent 99 trusts the issuer of Max's certificate to make key-name binding statements
- How can we convince Agent 99 to trust the issuer of Max's certificate?
- Solution: Agent 99 must implicitly trust *some* set of public keys
 - Once she does that, those public keys can introduce other public keys to her (hierarchical model)






Public Key Infrastructure

- AIRHEADS 2013
- A Certificate Authority (CA) guarantees the binding between a public key and another CA or an "End Entity" (EE)





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


Certificate Authority Best Practice



- Normally, self-signed root CAs are created, then these create subordinate CAs
- Once subordinate CAs have been created, the root is taken offline
 - If the root is compromised, the trust model is broken and the bad guys can fool you into trusting a cert that is bogus





Certificate Authority Best Practices








Symantec/VeriSign Data Center



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Who do you trust?



Windows: Start->Run->certmgr.msc

Action View Favorites Window Help	Computer)\Trusted Root Certification Autho							
nsole Root	Issued To 🔺	Issued By	Expiration Date	Intended Purposes	Friendly Name	Т		
Certificates (Local Computer)	AAA Certificate Services	AAA Certificate Services	1/01/2029	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
Personal	AC Raíz Certicámara S.A.	AC Raíz Certicámara S.A.	2/04/2030	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
- Trusted Root Certification Authorities	AC RAIZ DNIE	AC RAIZ DNIE	8/02/2036	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	DIRECCION GENERAL DE LA POLICIA			
Certificates	AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM	AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM	1/01/2030	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM			
Enterprise Trust	ACEDICOM Root	ACEDICOM Root	13/04/2028	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	EDICOM			
Intermediate Certification Authorities	A-CERT ADVANCED	A-CERT ADVANCED	23/10/2011	Encrypting File System, Time Stamping, Secure	A-CERT ADVANCED			
Trusted Publishers	ACNLB	ACNLB	15/05/2023	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, C				
Untrusted Certificates	Actalis Authentication CA G1	Actalis Authentication CA G1	25/06/2022	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	Actalis Authentication CA G1			
Third-Party Root Certification Authorities	AddTrust External CA Root	AddTrust External CA Root	30/05/2020	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
⊡… 🔁 Trusted People ∃ 💼 Other People	AdminCA-CD-T01	AdminCA-CD-T01	25/01/2016	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, C				
u	Admin-Root-CA	Admin-Root-CA	10/11/2021	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, C				
H Certificate Enrollment Requests	AffirmTrust Commercial	AffirmTrust Commercial	31/12/2030	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
I''' SPC I''' Windows Live ID Token Issuer	AffirmTrust Networking	AffirmTrust Networking	31/12/2030	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	AffirmTrust Premium	AffirmTrust Premium	31/12/2040	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	AffirmTrust Premium ECC	AffirmTrust Premium ECC	31/12/2040	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
□ ∃ 券	Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique	Agence Nationale de Certification Electro	12/08/2037	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique	Agence Nationale de Certification Electro	12/08/2037	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	-			
Certificates - Current User	America Online Root Certification Authority 1	America Online Root Certification Authorit	19/11/2037	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	2			
, IP Security Monitor	America Online Root Certification Authority 2	America Online Root Certification Authorit		Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
IP Security Policies on Local Computer	ANCERT Certificados CGN	ANCERT Certificados CGN	11/02/2024	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
Event Viewer (Local)	ANCERT Certificados Notariales	ANCERT Certificados Notariales	11/02/2024	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
Computer Management (Local)	ANCERT Corporaciones de Derecho Publico	ANCERT Corporaciones de Derecho Publico	11/02/2024	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
🕻 Local Computer Policy	ANF Server CA	ANE Server CA	1/12/2021	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	Application CA G2	Application CA G2	31/03/2016	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	Application CA G2	Application CA G2	12/12/2017	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, C		`		
	A-Trust-nQual-01	A-Trust-nQual-01	1/12/2014	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, C				
	A-Trust-nQual-01	A-Trust-nOual-01	17/08/2015	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	-			
	A-Trust-Oual-03	A-Trust-Ngual-03 A-Trust-Qual-01	1/12/2014	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	-			
	A-Trust-Qual-01	A-Trust-Qual-01 A-Trust-Oual-02	3/12/2014	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	-			
	A-Trust-Qual-02	A-Trust-Qual-02 A-Trust-Qual-03	24/04/2018	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	•			
	A-Irust-Quai-03 Autoridad Certificadora Raiz de la Secretaria				-			
	Autoridad Certificadora Raiz de la Secretaria		8/05/2025	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
			9/05/2025	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	Autoridad de Certificacion de la Abogacia	Autoridad de Certificacion de la Abogacia	13/06/2030	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, C	-			
	Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional C		24/10/2013	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	=		31/12/2030	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	•			
	Autoridad de Certificacion Raiz del Estado Ve			Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	🔛 Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira	Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira	1/12/2011	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira v1	Autoridade Certificadora Raiz Brasileira v1	29/07/2021	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se				
	Baltimore CyberTrust Root	Baltimore CyberTrust Root	13/05/2025	Server Authentication, Secure Email	Baltimore CyberTrust Root			
	Belgacom E-Trust Root CA for normalised cer		5/11/2021	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	-			
	Belgacom E-Trust Root CA for qualified certifi		10/08/2021	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	-			
	Buypass Class 2 CA 1	Buypass Class 2 CA 1	13/10/2016	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	Buypass Class 2 CA 1			
	Buypass Class 3 CA 1	Buypass Class 3 CA 1	9/05/2015	Server Authentication, Client Authentication, Se	Buypass Class 3 CA 1			









 Windows Server includes a domain-aware CA – why not just use it?


Disadvantages:

- PKI is complex. Might be easier to let Verisign/Thawte/etc. do it for you.
- Nobody outside your Windows domain will trust your certificates

Advantages:

- Less costly
- Better security possible. Low chances of someone outside organization getting a certificate from your internal PKI






ClearPass as a CA



Only intended for BYOD – not a general-purpose CA

- No Web enrollment interface
- No manual enrollment interface
- Limited (BYOD-focused) policy controls
- Recommendation: Use for deploying BYOD certs which have limited applicability
 - Valid for WLAN access to a limited access zone
 - Not valid for other enterprise services (email, VPN, app signon, etc.)






Public Key Infrastructure (3)



- Agent Agent 99 trusts Max's public key if there is a valid chain of certificates from Max's public key to a root CA that Agent 99 implicitly trusts
 - Web browsers also check DNS hostname == certificate Common Name (CN)
- Chain Building & Validation






Certificate Validity



? X Certificate ? × Certificate D General ? X Certificate General De Show: </ General Details Certification Path Show: <A Field • Signat Show: <All> Field E Issuer CRL Di . Value 🖃 Valid f Field Certific CRL Distribution Points [1]CRL Distribution Point: Distr... Valid 1 Enhance Author e Certificate Policies [1]Certificate Policy:Policy Ide... Subject Enhanced Key Usage Public Server Authentication (1.3.6.... Author Basic Authority Key Identifier KeyID=6f ec af a0 dd 8a a4 ef... Key U Authority Information Access [1]Authority Info Access: Acc... Thumb 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.12 30 60 a1 5e a0 5c 30 5a 30 58... Thumb Thumbprint algorithm sha1 dinsdag 29 Thumbprint 9b 57 05 3d d4 93 fe 40 c0 ec ... [1]CRL Dist Distribut [1]Authority Info Access Full N Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol U U (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) Alternative Name: URL=http://ocsp.verisign.com [2]Authority Info Access Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2) Alternative Name: URL=http://SVRSecure-aia.verisign.com/SVRSecure2005-aia.cer Edit Properties... Copy to File... OK



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


Good to Know: Apple TV



- With the latest version of Apple TV iOS, WPA2 Enterprise can be used
- However, the Apple TV does not have a clock
- So when it is rebooted, it thinks it is January, 1970, aka the "epoch"
- It will not authenticate successfully because it will not trust the network's cert is valid
- NTP must complete first to fix the time









- Can be used by the *client* (e.g. web browser) to verify server's certificate validity
 - OCSP URL is read from server certificate's AIA field
- Can be used by the server (e.g. mobility controller) to verify client's certificate validity
 - OCSP URL is most often configured on the server to point to specific OCSP responders
- OCSP transactions use HTTP for transport protocol
- Important: Nonce Extension required for replay prevention
 - Some public CAs don't like this...





OCSP – Two Variants




OCSP Direct Trust Model

- Each OCSP responder has an OCSP Responder certificate
- Each Responder cert must be installed on relying party (controller)
- ArubaOS only supports a single Responder cert problem for redundancy

OCSP Delegated Trust Model

- OCSP responder has an OCSP Responder cert issued by each issuing CA for which it can respond
- Relying party checks to see that OCSP response is signed by a known cert
- Requires each issuing CA cert to be installed on relying party (controller) because chaining is not supported
- Requires ArubaOS 6.1.4.1-FIPS or ArubaOS 6.3+





For More Info



#airheadsconf




30



Aruba Certificate Operations







Certificate Formats



• PEM / PKCS#7

Contains a certificate in base64 encoding (open in a text editor)


• DER

- Contains a certificate in binary encoding

• PFX / PKCS#12

 Contains a certificate AND private key, protected by a password





Relevant Certificate Types



Server Certificate

- Used by controller to authenticate to the client (EAP-TLS, PEAP, Web)


CA Certificate

- Used by controller to validate client certificate (EAP-TLS only)

Client Certificate

 Used by client to authenticate to the network (EAP-TLS only)






Using Certificate Signing Request



- Private key stays on controller
- CSR is sent to CA
 - How this works depends on the CA type
- CA issues certificate in PEM/CER or DER format
- Certificate is uploaded to controller
- Controller puts certificate back together with private key automatically





Generating Certificate Signing Request AIRHEADS


Manageme			
manayeme		×	
Upload	CSR Information		
opicaa	Subject		
CSR Inf	C=US		
	L=Sunnyvale		
CSR Ty			
Key Ler	OU=Jon CN=172.16.0.254		
Commo	emailAddress=jgreen@arubanetworks.com		
Country	BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST		
State/P	MIIBhTCCAQwCAQAwgYwxCzAJBgNVBAYTA1VTMQswCQYDVQQIEwJDQTESMBAGA1UE		
City	BxMJU3Vubn12YWx1MQ4wDAYDVQQKEwVBcnViYTEMMAoGA1UECxMDSm9uMRUwEwYD		
Organiz	VQQDEwwxNzIuMTYuMC4yNTQxJzAlBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWGGpncmVlbkBhcnViYW51		
_	dHdvcmtzLmNvbTB2MBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAiA2IABDaEtISvruH1mihZVyAs fDZJ0ENAQEsI0RW1nXOqDSrAvJihbnqd/aiUQRZLpLHFNiOdgMUH4091H4KBoTZu		
Unit	LnsQm9gTcSUgLVThvc8fVObx1ceURy5vuYUnTy9zyk1FL6AAMAkGByqGSM49BAED		
Email A			
	M5FfKY/Y1AIwMKs1IxAxE01W4vx8u9bViKyiSiEEPGCabuxdKhhvzuTqlqrOwY9p		•
	a911yMNk/GA2		
-	END CERTIFICATE REQUEST		
		~	
		ОК	



35

Send CSR to your CA of choice







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Uploading Certificates



MANAGEMENT General Administration Certificates SNMP Logging Clock Guest Provisioning


Upload	CSR	Revo	cation CheckPoint			
Upload a Certificate						
Certificate Name]		
Certificate Filename				Browse		
Passphrase (optional)				For import p		
Retype Passphrase]		
Certificate Format			PKCS7 💌			
Certificate Type			Trusted CA CRL Intermediate CA OCSP Responder Cert OCSP Signer Cert	•		
Certifi	cate Lis	ts O	Public Cert Server Cert Trusted CA	•		



Uploading Certificate



#airheadsconf






Putting it all together: 802.1X








Authentication with 802.1X



- Authenticates users before granting access to L2 media
- Makes use of EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol)
- 802.1X authentication happens at L2 – users will be authenticated before an IP address is assigned


Wireless network properties					
Association Authentication Connection	1				
Select this option to provide authenticated network access for wireless Ethemet networks.					
Enable IEEE 802.1x authentication for this network					
EAP type: Protected EAP (PEAP)	•				
Propertie	s				
Authenticate as computer when computer information is available					
Authenticate as guest when user or computer information is unavailable					
OK Car	ncel				





Sample EAP Transaction





EAPOL 2-stage process

- Outer tunnel establishment
- Credential exchange happens inside the encrypted tunnel



802.1X Acronym Soup



PEAP (Protected EAP)

- Uses a digital certificate on the network side
- Password or certificate on the client side

EAP-TLS (EAP with Transport Level Security)

- Uses a certificate on network side
- Uses a certificate on client side

TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security)

- Uses a certificate on the network side
- Password, token, or certificate on the client side

EAP-FAST

- Cisco proprietary
- Do not use known security weaknesses







A POP-UP BOOK BY CARLA DIJS

Configure Supplicant Properly

ا 🎉	Netwo	rk Cor	nections				
Fi	_ <mark>_</mark> Wii	reless	Network Connection Properties				
C	Gew	Ge Wireless network properties					
Ad	I	Assc	Protected EAP Properties				
		Sei wir	When connecting:				
			Connect to these servers:				
		EA	radius1.arubanetworks.com, radius2.arubanetworks.com Trusted <u>R</u> oot Certification Authorities:				
			America Online Root Certification Authority 2 ANCERT Certificados CGN ANCERT Certificados Notariales ANCERT Corporaciones de Derecho Publico Application CA G2 Arge Daten Oesterreichische Gesellschaft fuer Datenschutz aruba-server				
			Do not prompt user to authorize new servers or trusted certification authorities.				
			Select Authentication Method:				
1			Secured password (EAP-MSCHAP v2)				
	3		Enable Fast Reconnect				
	Detail	s	OK Cancel				


- Configure the Common Name of your RADIUS server (matches CN in server certificate)
- Configure trusted CAs (an in-house CA is better than a public CA)
- ALWAYS validate the server certificate
- Do not allow users to add new CAs or trust new servers
- Enforce with group policy

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Role-Based Security



Multiple classes of users on same infrastructure easily separated





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Why Worry About Access Control?



Where is the "network perimeter" today?



- Mobility brings us:
 - Disappearance of physical security
 - New mobile users, devices appearing everyday
 - Increased exposure to malware
- Assuming that "the bad guys are outside the firewall, the good guys are inside" is a recipe for disaster

Multi-Factor 802.1X Authentication?



Sequenced authentication

- Machine credential followed by user credential
- Sequencing must be tracked by auth server (CPPM)
- Supported in Windows domain environment.... but nowhere else
- Timing / user behavior dependencies


Hardware tokens

- Viable option, but users don't like them...
- Use EAP-GTC, EAP-POTP
- RSA supplicant available

Stacked authentication

- Machine and user credential in same EAP transaction
- Theoretically possible, but not supported by any known supplicant (Aruba is developing one for Windows...)






Isn't MSCHAPv2 broken?



- Short answer: Yes because of things like rainbow tables, distributed cracking, fast GPUs, etc.
- This is why we use MSCHAPv2 inside a TLS tunnel for Wi-Fi
- Still using PPTP for VPN? Watch out...






Future directions: EAP-PWD

AIRHEADS 2013

- The problem: Today's password-based auth exposes password hashes to a possibly unknown entity
- Goal of PWD: Mutual authentication using a password
- Both sides prove they possess the password without actually *exposing* the password or a password derivative
- Developed by Dan Harkins of Aruba Networks standardized in RFC5931









- Some slides stolen from: <u>http://cevi-users.cevi.be/Portals/ceviusers/</u> images/default/Userdag-20101125-Certs.pptx
- Some others stolen from: <u>http://acs.lbl.gov/~mrt/talks/secPrimer.ppt</u>
- Get Smart images used without permission







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